

## Message Text

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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE  
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 035470

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGOV, XF, US

SUBJECT: ATHERTON MEETING WITH DAYAN IN NEW YORK

REF: STATE 34284

1. SUMMARY: DAYAN APPRECIATED BRIEFING GIVEN BY  
ATHERTON FEBRUARY 9 ON SADAT VISIT. SAID ISRAEL WOULD  
HAVE PREFERRED RESUMPTION OF POLITICAL COMMITTEE  
MEETINGS, BUT WAS CONTENT TO HAVE ATHERTON TRY TO MAKE  
PROGRESS BY ACTING AS MIDDLEMAN. REFERRED TO DECLARATION  
OF PRINCIPLES AS OBJECTIVE OF THIS NEXT PHASE AND DID NOT  
PICK UP IN ANY WAY, ALTHOUGH NEITHER DID HE REJECT, IDEA  
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OF ALSO BEGINNING INFORMAL DISCUSSION OF GUIDELINES  
FOR NEGOTIATIONS RELATED TO WEST BANK/GAZA ISSUES  
DAYAN SHOWED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN OUR ASSESSMENT THAT  
SADAT FEELS HE NEEDS HUSSEIN BUT NOT SYRIA IN  
NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE HE COULD PROCEED WITH BILATERAL  
SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL. ON ARMS FOR EGYPT, DAYAN  
ASKED SOME QUESTIONS, BUT WOULD NOT OFFER ISRAELI RE-  
ACTION SINCE THIS PROVINCE OF WEIZMAN AND PRIME MINISTER.  
DAYAN INDICATED HE PREFERRED NOT TO GET INTO FORMULA-  
TIONS AND SUCH DETAILS OF SUBSTANCE WHEN HE VISITS  
WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK. END SUMMARY.

2. ATHERTON ACCOMPANIED BY STERNER MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER DAYAN FOR OVER AN HOUR FEBRUARY 9 AT REGENCY HOTEL IN NEW YORK CITY. DINITZ, LAVIE AND RUBENSTEIN ALSO PRESENT. ATHERTON CONVEYED SECRETARY'S BEST WISHES AND SAID SECRETARY WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING DAYAN IN WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK. IN MEANTIME HE HAD ASKED ATHERTON TO GIVE DAYAN PROMPT REPORT ON RESULTS OF SADAT VISIT. ATHERTON THEN BRIEFED DAYAN, CLOSELY FOLLOWING TEXT OF REFTEL. AT VARIOUS POINTS DURING BRIEFING DAYAN INTERVENED WITH QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS. THIS TELEGRAM CONFINES ITSELF TO THESE INTERVENTIONS AND ATHERTON'S RESPONSES.

3. AT POINT WHEN ATHERTON DESCRIBED SADAT'S DISAPPOINTMENT OVER ISRAEL'S FAILURE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT RESOLUTION 242 WITHDRAWAL PROVISIONS APPLIED TO WEST BANK AND GAZA AS WELL AS OTHER FRONTS, DAYAN ASKED WHETHER SADAT HAD SAID HE WAS TALKING ABOUT TOTAL WITHDRAWAL FROM THESE TERRITORIES. ATHERTON SAID THIS WAS CERTAINLY SADAT'S OFFICIAL POSITION BUT AT SAME TIME HIS REMARKS MADE IT CLEAR HE RECOGNIZED WITHDRAWAL  
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SHOULD TAKE PLACE OVER PERIOD OF TIME AND WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF ARRANGEMENTS THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY PROTECT ISRAEL'S SECURITY. IT WOULD PROBABLY BE MORE ACCURATE TO SAY SADAT WANTS ISRAEL TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF WITHDRAWAL APPLIES TO WEST BANK/ GAZA AS WELL AS SINAI AND GOLAN.

4. DAYAN ASKED WHETHER SADAT WENT AWAY WITH IMPRESSION THAT PRESIDENT CARTER SUPPORTS HIS DEMAND FOR FULL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES, ALBEIT IN THE CONTEXT OF A TIMETABLE AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. ATHERTON SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF TERRITORIAL QUESTION IN EITHER SINAI OR GOLAN (IN THE CASE OF THE FORMER UNDOUBTEDLY BECAUSE SADAT FELT THE ISRAELIS HAD ALREADY AGREED TO A RESTORATION OF EGYPTIAN SOVEREIGNTY TO THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY OF SINAI). IN THE CASE OF THE WEST BANK/GAZA, PRESIDENT CARTER HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE BELIEVED THE PRINCIPLE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL MUST APPLY THERE ALSO, BUT HE HAD NOT SPECIFIED TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. INDEED WE HAD IMPRESSION FROM THE WAY SADAT SPOKE DURING THE MEETINGS THAT SADAT UNDERSTANDS THE NEED FOR BORDER CHANGES ON THE WEST BANK. AT ONE POINT SADAT HAD MADE THE COMMENT THAT AFTER ALL, FROM THE OLD LINES, "YOU COULD SEE THE SEA."

5. DAYAN ASKED WHETHER SADAT HAD SAID ANYTHING ABOUT THE

ISSUES IN SINAI SUCH AS SHARM AL-SHEIKH, DEMILITARIZED ZONES, OR THE QUESTION OF ISRAELI AIRFIELDS? ATHERTON SAID THAT ASIDE FROM SADAT'S MENTION OF HIS WILLINGNESS TO HAVE A UN PRESENCE AT SHARM AL-SHEIKH, AND BOTH DEMILITARIZED AND LIMITED FORCES ZONES, HE HAD NOT GONE DEEPLY INTO THE SPECIFICS OF THE BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL. IT WAS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT SADAT WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE SECRET

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QUESTION OF ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS, PARTICULARLY THOSE IN SINAI. THIS CAME UP OVER AND OVER AGAIN IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS DISAPPOINTMENT THAT ISRAEL HAD NOT CAUGHT THE SPIRIT OF THE NEW ATMOSPHERE FOR NEGOTIATIONS THAT SADAT'S TRIP TO JERUSALEM SHOULD HAVE CREATED.

6. ON THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, DAYAN ASKED WHETHER WE THOUGHT SADAT WOULD GO ALONG WITH A DECLARATION OF THE KIND THAT THE TWO SIDES WERE PRESENTLY TALKING ABOUT, OR WAS HE NOW THINKING OF SOMETHING MORE FAR-REACHING? ATHERTON SAID SADAT WANTED TO PUT THE EMPHASIS ON ACHIEVING A DECLARATION. RECOGNIZING THIS MIGHT NOT BE ENOUGH TO GET KING HUSSEIN TO JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS, WE THOUGHT SADAT MIGHT BE WILLING TO START INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT ITEM B ON THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE AGENDA--GUIDELINES FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. ALTHOUGH ON THIS POINT SADAT WAS PROBABLY MORE FLEXIBLE THAN MOST OF HIS FOREIGN MINISTRY ADVISORS, HE HAD NOT FULLY COMMITTED EGYPT TO SUCH DISCUSSIONS NOW.

7. DAYAN ASKED WHETHER SADAT HOPED SOME PALESTINIANS AS WELL AS JORDAN MIGHT JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND IF SO, WHAT PALESTINIANS? ATHERTON SAID SADAT SEEMS TO THINK THAT IF HUSSEIN COULD BE INDUCED TO JOIN THE NEGOTIATIONS, SOME PALESTINIANS COULD ALSO BE FOUND WHO WOULD JOIN. HE SEEMED TO BE THINKING IN TERMS OF RESIDENTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, ALTHOUGH, TO BE ACCURATE, HE HADN'T EXPLICITLY RULED OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PALESTINIANS FROM OUTSIDE THOSE AREAS PARTICIPATING. SADAT'S COMMENTS CLEARLY INDICATED, HOWEVER, THAT HE BELIEVED THE PLO HAD, IN EFFECT, TAKEN ITSELF OUT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

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8. DAYAN SAID, IN OTHER WORDS, IT IS CLEAR THAT SADAT DOES NOT THINK OF THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AS JUST A THEORETICAL EXERCISE BUT RATHER AS A PRACTICAL WAY OF BRINGING THE JORDANIANS INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS. ATHERTON RESPONDED AFFIRMATIVELY. WHAT ABOUT SYRIA,

ASKED DAYAN? ATHERTON SAID SADAT HADN'T MENTIONED SYRIA IN THIS CONNECTION DURING THE MEETINGS. BUT,

PERSISTED DAYAN, YOU FEEL HE DEFINITELY NEEDS JORDAN BEFORE HE COULD PROCEED WITH A BILATERAL PEACE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL? ATHERTON SAID PERHAPS NOT IN THE SENSE OF WAITING UNTIL A PEACE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN NEGOTIATED WITH JORDAN, BUT HE AT LEAST WANTED JORDAN TO HAVE JOINED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. DAYAN ASKED WHETHER, EVEN IF ISRAEL SUCCEEDED IN RESOLVING ALL BILATERAL ISSUES WITH EGYPT, SADAT WOULD FEEL HE STILL COULD NOT CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT UNTIL HUSSEIN JOINED THE NEGOTIATIONS. ATHERTON SAID SADAT CLEARLY VIEWED HUSSEIN'S PARTICIPATION AS IMPORTANT, BUT IF THE KING TOOK WHAT SADAT CONSIDERED AN UNREASONABLE POSITION AFTER A DECLARATION WAS ACHIEVED WHICH SADAT CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT, WE DID NOT THINK SADAT WOULD ALLOW THIS TO KEEP HIM FROM PROCEEDING ON HIS OWN. ASKED ABOUT SADAT'S SENSE OF TIME, ATHERTON SAID HE WAS CLEARLY THINKING IN TERMS OF WEEKS, NOT MONTHS, WITH RESPECT TO ACHIEVING SUBSTANTIAL RESULTS.

9. IN RESPONSE TO ATHERTON'S BRIEFING ABOUT THE IMMEDIATE NEXT STEPS, DAYAN SAID ISRAEL WOULD WELCOME ATHERTON'S RETURN TO THE AREA AND A RESUMPTION  
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